Anscombe’s own position varied somewhat over the course of hercareer.

Anscombe met Wittgenstein at Cambridge, after her graduation fromOxford. She attended his lectures and became one of his mostdevoted students. She believed that it was Wittgenstein’slectures, for example, that freed her from the trap of phenomenalism(MPM, ix). When she returned to Oxford she continued to travel toCambridge to study with Wittgenstein.

Anscombe and Roger Teichmann (Cambridge, 2000).

Anscombe’s principal essays are collected in the followingfive volumes.

Individual essays by Anscombe cited in the text:

Anscombe’s account of intention and intentionalaction has informed much of the subsequent literature on thetopic. Donald Davidson (1980) expanded on her claims regardingact identification and agreed that:

Major translations by Anscombe include the following:

This passage raises some very deep issues regarding the nature ofintention. For example, Anscombe seems to indicate that one kindof reason relates to the agent’s desires for a certainstate of affairs. If I intend to do y must it be the case that I,all things considered, want y to come about; or merely that I allthings considered want to do y? Michael Bratman (1987) wouldquery this by noting that the belief/desire model of intention fails toadequately model the organizational role intentions play in practicaldeliberation.

Anscombe’s comment on Bennett’s criticism comprises one of thebriefest philosophical essays, which I quote in its entirety here:

Jun 20, 2008 · Modern Moral Philosophy - G

Anscombe’s views on intention also figured largely in her defense andarticulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect, which will be discussedin more detail below.

Anscombe on the Moral Ought and Moral Corruption | …

This quite naturally then leads to an emphasis on developing avirtue ethics that would be distinct from the modern approachesAnscombe attacks in MMP.

When abbreviations are used to cite Anscombe’s works in the text, theabbreviation begins the bibliographic item below.

Elizabeth Anscombe | Issue 31 | Philosophy Now

What is certain is that in the latter half of the twentieth century Anscombe could hold her own with any philosopher in the world." - Anthony Kenny

"I met Elizabeth Anscombe in 1960, and was overwhelmed by her brilliance.

Results for 'Anscombe modern moral philosophy ..

Anscombe on Spirit and Intention - Oxford Scholarship

Again, in order to employ DDE one needs the distinction betweenintended and merely foreseen consequences of the ‘actitself.’ On Anscombe’s view some actions are in and ofthemselves immoral, regardless of the consequences one intends to bringabout in the performance of the action, and certainly regardless ofwhat one foresees as a result of the action. But manyconsequentialists don’t recognize a morally relevantdistinction between intention and foresight. Jonathan Bennett,for example, was highly critical of this distinction.

Anscombe was born to Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe and Allen Wells Anscombe, on 18 March 1919, ..

3 Anscombe on Spirit and Intention;

An alternative reading is as a modus tollens argumentintended to establish the superiority of a religious based ethics. (Formore on a skeptical reading of MMP, see Crisp 2004.) Assume for thesake of argument there is no God, and religiously based moral theory isincorrect. On Anscombe’s view modern theories such asKantian ethics, Utilitarianism, and social contract theory are sorelyinadequate for a variety of reasons, but one major worry is that theytry to adopt the legalistic framework without the right backgroundassumptions to ground it. An alternative would be to develop akind of naturalized approach where we carefully consider moralpsychology as it relates to the human good. However, thisapproach itself is problematic. The prospect of articulating acomplete and plausible account of the human good along these lines isdim.